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RETHINKING EXCESSIVE FORCE
R. WILSON FREYERMUTH*
Each year claimants file thousands of section 1983 actions against
law enforcement or prison officials. Many of these claimants allege that
officials used excessive force against them in violation of their constitutional rights. Despite the large number of excessive force cases in the
federal courts, however, the Supreme Court has decided only two excessive force cases brought under section 1983. In Whitley v. Albers, 1 the
Court elaborated the appropriate standard for determining whether the
shooting of a prisoner violated the eighth amendment. In Tennessee v.
Garner,2 the Court applied the fourth amendment to strike down a Tennessee statute that authorized the use of deadly force to apprehend a
nondangerous fleeing suspect. In each case, the Court recognized that
the application of force implicated a specific fourth or eighth amendment
right and applied the standard developed to protect that right.
Against this background, let us pose a hypothetical. Suppose that
the police see a man and his companion exit a grocery store. Because the
man is in a highly agitated state, the police stop the two to investigate.
The companion informs the police that the man is an epileptic and is
suffering a mild seizure. A brief investigation by one officer reveals that
the man has committed no crime and possesses no weapon. Another
officer, however, mistakes the man's erratic behavior for a reaction to
hallucinogenic drugs. This officer proceeds to push the man to the
ground, handcuff him, and throw him against the police car. Upon
checking the man's wallet, the officer discovers a medical identification

card that confirms the man's epilepsy. The officer then shoves the man
into the backseat of the police car and drives him home, ignoring his
pleas for medical assistance. During the incident, the man suffers several
broken bones and moderately severe head injuries. He then files a section
1983 action claiming that the officer used excessive force.
If this man's attorneys read only Supreme Court decisions, they
would advise him that Garner requires a court to apply the fourth
* B.S., B.A. 1984, University of'North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1987, Duke University
School of Law. The author wishes to thank Roger Brooks for his helpful suggestions. The author
also wishes to extend special thanks to Alan Wingfield for his helpful criticism on earlier drafts of

this comment.
1. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
2. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).

Vol. 1987:692]

EXCESSIVE FORCE

amendment to determine whether the police used excessive force against
him. This fourth amendment inquiry would be a wholly objective one- 3
whether the "totality of the circumstances" justified the officer's actions.
If his attorneys read the decisions of most federal courts of appeals, however, they would discover that their prior advice would be erroneous in
those courts. The lower federal courts have developed and applied a different standard in all section 1983 excessive force cases. Under this standard, first developed in Johnson v. Glick, 4 the decisionmaker must
consider-among other factors-whether the official applied force "in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sa'5
distically for the very purpose of causing harm."
This standard, with its roots deep in the heart of substantive due
process, has until recently enjoyed unanimous if unreflective approval in
the federal district and circuit courts. These courts have applied this
standard mechanically-to the claims of prisoners, pretrial detainees,
suspects and free citizens alike-regardless of the surrounding circum-6
stances or the specific constitutional right implicated by the use of force.
The natural effect of this practice has been to create an abstract constitutional right to be free of excessive force, defined and protected solely by
7
the standard set forth in Johnson.
As this comment demonstrates, this generic substantive due process
standard requires the decisionmaker to consider issues-such as an officer's subjective motivation or the extent of the plaintiff's injury-that
are often irrelevant under the standards developed by the Supreme Court
to protect the fourth or eighth amendment right implicated by the use of
force. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized this inconsistency in Lester v. City of Chicago8 and rejected substantive due process analysis of claims alleging excessive force in arrest.
The rest of the circuits should follow Lester of their own volition, or the
Supreme Court should leave them no choice. Furthermore, courts
should make clear that substantive due process need not play any role in
deciding excessive force cases and that for most citizens the fourth
amendment provides the primary source of constitutional protection
from excessive force. 9
3. Id. at 8-9.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

481 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
Id. at 1033.
See infra notes 10-25 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1987).
See infra notes 36-98 and accompanying text.
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I
The circuits' excessive force standard originated in the 1973 Second
Circuit decision in Johnson v. Glick 10 Johnson involved a pretrial detainee who had filed a section 1983 action claiming that a prison guard
assaulted him. In evaluating the detainee's claim, the court did not apply
the fourth or eighth amendment.11 Instead, the court held that one's
constitutional protection from excessive force "is not limited to conduct
violating the specific command of the Eighth Amendment, or ... of the
Fourth.... [Q]uite apart from any 'specific' of the Bill of Rights, application of undue force by law enforcement officers deprives a suspect of
liberty without due process of law." 12 In support of its substantive due
process standard, the Johnson court cited Rochin v. California,13 in
Which the Supreme Court used the due process clause to reverse a conviction based on evidence obtained by pumping the defendant's stomach.
Analogizing from Rochin, the Johnson court held that an officer's
use of force is constitutionally excessive if the force "shocks the conscience." 14 The Johnson court, having imposed upon itself a rather inexact standard, set forth four factors for courts to apply in determining
Whether the use of force shocks the conscience:
the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need
and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted,
and whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline1 or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
5
of causing harm.
These factors, or similar formulations thereof, gained rapid acceptance in the federal courts of appeals. 16 Roughly half of the appellate
10. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
11. The Johnson court gave two reasons for refusing to apply the eighth amendment. First, the
court believed that a spontaneous attack by a prison guard was not "punishment." Id. at 1032. But
cf Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (excessive force claim by prisoner analyzed under eighth
amendment). Second, the court correctly believed that the eighth amendment's protections did not
apply until after conviction and sentence. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1032. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) ("[T]he state does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth
Amendment is concerned until after it has secured formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with

due process of law.").
The Johnson court apparently decided not to apply the fourth amendment based on the weight
of prior authority. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
12. 481 F.2d at 1032.
13. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1032-33 (citing and discussing Rochin).
14. 481 F.2d at 1033 (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172).

15. Id.
16. Some circuits have applied a three-factor standard that is essentially identical to the Johnson standard. Under this standard, a state officer's use of force is unconstitutional if it "1) caused
severe injuries, 2) was grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances, and
3) was inspired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of zeal so that it amounted to
an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience." Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1400
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decisions applying the Johnson factors involve the excessive force claims
of convicted prisoners. Some courts have analyzed these claims under
the eighth amendment, 17 others under the due process clause, 18 and
others without identifying any specific constitutional provision.' 9 The remainder of the decisions involve excessive force claims brought either by
"bystanders" or by persons subjected to an arrest or investigatory stop.
20
Some courts have evaluated these claims under the due process clause, 2
others under both the fourth amendment and the due process clause, '
and yet others without identifying a specific constitutional provision. 22 A
few decisions involve the excessive force claims of pretrial detainees. The
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986), overruled, Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d
706 (7th Cir. 1987). See also Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 1981); Shillingford v.
Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).
17. See, e.g., Davis v. Lane, 814 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187,
1188-90 (11th Cir. 1987); McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1986) (concurrently
analyzed under due process clause); El'Amin v. Pearce, 750 F.2d 829, 831-33 (10th Cir. 1984); Bates
v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1151-52 (7th Cir. 1984) (concurrently analyzed under fifth amendment due
process clause); Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1268-71 (7th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1085
(1985); Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d 963, 969-72 (4th Cir. 1984); Williams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d
1130, 1132-34 (3d Cir. 1983) (suggesting that same standard may apply under due process clause);
McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146-47 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 998 (1983); Sampley v.
Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 494-96 (10th Cir. 1983); Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993, 998-1000 (7th Cir.
1980).
18. McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 784-86 (9th Cir. 1986) (concurrently analyzed under
eighth amendment); Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253, 1258-59 (6th Cir. 1986); Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 99-101 (8th Cir. 1986); Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1151-52 (7th Cir. 1984)
(concurrently analyzed under eighth amendment); Freeman v. Franzen, 695 F.2d 485, 491-92 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983); Martinez v. Rosado, 614 F.2d 829, 831-32 (2d Cir.
1980); Meredith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d 481, 482-84 (9th Cir. 1975).
19. Massop v. Coughlin, 770 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1985); Hodges v. Stanley, 712 F.2d 34, 36
(2d Cir. 1983); King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70, 72-73 (4th Cir. 1980); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d
80, 95-96 (1st Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980).
20. Dale v. Janklow, 828 F.2d 481, 484-85 (8th Cir. 1987) (urrest); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d
913, 923-25 (2d Cir. 1987) (no arrest); Brower v. County of Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir.
1987) (apprehension at roadblock), petition for cert.filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3251 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1987)
(No. 87-248); Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1005-07 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (arrest); Rutherford v. City of
Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1446-48 (9th Cir. 1986) (arrest); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d
1436, 1439-42 (11th Cir. 1985) (arrest); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 581-83 (6th Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (arrest); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333-35 (10th Cir. 1981) (no arrest); Shillingford v.
Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (bystander).
21. Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1416-17 (9th Cir.) (stop), cert denied, 108 S. Ct.
311 (1987); Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1213-17 (1st Cir. 1986) (apprehension by deadly
force); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499-1502 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (en bane) (questioning
before arrest), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1115 and 476 U.S. 1124 (1986).
22. Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945, 948 (4th Cir. 1987) (stop); Popham v. City of
Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1987) (arrest); Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158,
1162-64 (5th Cir. 1986) (arrest); Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1371 (8th Cir. 1985) (arrest);
Bauer v. Norris, 713 F.2d 408, 411-13 (8th Cir. 1983) (arrest).
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circuits have analyzed these claims under the due process clause. 23
In all of these types of cases-regardless of the plaintiff's status or
the circumstances surrounding the use of force-the circuits have applied
the Johnson factors in the same manner. Despite having recent opportunities to do so, however, the Supreme Court has never adopted such an
absolute approach. In fact, careful analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions in Whitley 24 and Garner2 5 compels the conclusion that the continued application of the Johnson standard in all excessive force cases is
incorrect.
II
Unlike the circuits, the Supreme Court has not mandated a subjective substantive due process approach for evaluating all excessive force
claims by prisoners. In Whitley v. Albers,26 the Court addressed the limitations that the eighth amendment places on an official's use of force
against a prisoner. Whitley involved a prisoner who was shot by prison
officials who were attempting to free hostages taken during a prison riot.
The prisoner subsequently filed a section 1983 action claiming that the
shooting violated the eighth amendment.
In a five-to-four opinion, the Court rejected the prisoner's claim.
The Court reiterated that the central requirement of an eighth amendment violation is the "'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'" and
27
that this standard remains the same in all eighth amendment cases.
The Court recognized, however, that courts must apply this standard
"with due regard for differences in the kind of conduct against which an
Eighth Amendment objection is lodged."' 28 In other words, courts
should extend different levels of deference toward prison officials facing
different circumstances. In many cases a state's responsibility to attend
to the needs or honor the rights of prisoners does not "clash with other
equally important governmental responsibilities. ' 29 In such cases, the
existence of an eighth amendment violation can be determined "without
23. Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 383 n.4 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Maddox v. City of Los
Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1413-16 (9th Cir. 1986); H.C. ex rel. by Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080,
1084-86 (11th Cir. 1986); Owens v. City of Atlanta, 780 F.2d 1564, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1986); Norris
v. District of Columbia, 737 F.2d 1148, 1150-52 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Smith v. Iron County, 692 F.2d
685, 686-88 (10th Cir. 1982); Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1981); Putman v.
Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415, 420-22 (8th Cir. 1981); Arroyo v. Schaefer, 548 F.2d 47, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1977);
Hamilton v. Chaffin, 506 F.2d 904, 909-10 (5th Cir. 1975).
24, See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
26. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
27. Id. at 319 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977)).
28. Id. at 320.
29. Id.
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the necessity of balancing competing institutional concerns."' 30 Other
circumstances, however, require greater deference toward prison officials.

During a prison disturbance, for example, prison officials must consider
not only the risk of harm to the inmate against whom force is used, but
also the risk of harm to others if officials do not control the disturbance.
The Supreme Court concluded that when prison officials use force to resolve a disturbance that "indisputably poses significant risks" to prison
security, "the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary

and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on 'whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.' "31 The
Court suggested that factors relevant to this threshold determination include "'the need for the application of force, the relationship between
the need and the amount of the force that was used, [and] the extent of

injury inflicted.'

"32

Although Whitley applies the Johnson factors to defeat a prisoner's
excessive force claim, this is the Supreme Court's only application of the
Johnson factors in a section 1983 case. Moreover, the Supreme Court's
explanation of when and how a court can apply those factors to a pris-

oner's excessive force claim differs noticeably from the circuit courts'
mechanical application of those factors to every claim. Whitley requires
a bifurcated inquiry, permitting consideration of "malice" only when
other "equally important governmental responsibilities"-such as an offi-

cial's duty to ensure prison security-clash with a prisoner's eighth
amendment rights. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit recently recognized in Wyatt v. Delaney,33 equally important gov34
ernmental responsibilities are not present in all excessive force cases.
30. Id. In these cases, the appropriate standard would be one like the "deliberate indifference"
standard articulated in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
31. 475 U.S. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
32. Id. at 321 (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033).
33. 818 F.2d 21, 23 (8th Cir. 1987) (when case does not involve prison security measure undertaken to resolve prison disturbance, court should not apply malice factor).
34. See, eg., McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1986). In McRore, a prison guard
stripsearched an inmate after a shakedown search. The guard ordered the inmate to spread his legs
apart and tapped the inside of the inmate's thigh with a riot stick. When the inmate involuntarily
giggled, the guard responded "you think that's funny, huh?" and attempted to plunge the riot stick
into the inmate's anus. Id. at 781-82.
Whitley requires heightened deference to the judgment of prison officials when "a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a disturbance ... that indisputably poses significant risks to the
safety of inmates and prison staff," 475 U.S. at 320, or when the" 'ever-present potential for violent
confrontation and conflagration' ... ripens into actual unrest and conflict," id. at 321 (quoting Jones
v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132 (1977)). As McRorie demonstrates, these exigent circumstances are not present in every excessive force case.
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Wyatt underscores the Court's recognition that the Johnson "malice" inquiry is not necessary or appropriate in every excessive force case impli35
cating eighth amendment rights.
III

The circuits also have applied the Johnson factors to all section 1983
claims by persons subjected to force during an arrest or investigatory
stop. Whereas Whitley demonstrates that courts should sometimes, but
not always, apply the Johnson factors to a prisoner's excessive force
claim, the Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence establishes
that courts should never apply all of the Johnson factors to excessive

force claims arising from an arrest or investigatory stop.
The fourth amendment provides citizens with a right to be secure in
their persons from unreasonable seizures. This right protects an individual's "legitimate expectations that in certain places and at certain times
he has 'the right to be let alone.' ",36 In Terry v. Ohio,3 7 the Supreme
Court acknowledged the breadth of this right in defining when a
''seizure" occurs. The Court recognized that a seizure of the person includes any conduct that "by means of physical force.., has in some way
38
restrained the liberty of a citizen."
Terry states a broad notion of what constitutes a seizure-one that
compels the conclusion that "any application of physical force to a citi-

zen which has the effect of disabling him physically to any extent" is a
35. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has mischaracterized Whitley's
holding. In Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1987), the court stated that Whitley
stands for the proposition that an excessive force claim arising under the eighth amendment ultimately turns on the presence or absence of malice or sadism by prison officials. Id. at 948 n.3. The
Graham court thus characterized the Johnson malice factor as "central" to an eighth amendment
excessive force claim. Id. This conclusion is incorrect. As Whitley reiterated, the central factor of
an eighth amendment excessive force claim is the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. If
prison officials apply force in response to a legitimate risk to prison security, the officials' good or bad
faith is relevant-indeed central-under Whitley. The Fourth Circuit's position in Graham
presumes that this will always be the case. As suggested supra note 34, however, prison officials do
not always apply force in response to legitimate prison security concerns. In these instances, the
officers' motives are irrelevant.
In a recent opinion by Justice Powell (sitting as a Circuit Judge), another panel of the Fourth
Circuit held that a "deliberate indifference" standard is appropriate when there is no clash between a
prisoner's needs or rights and "equally important governmental responsibilities." Lafaut v. Smith,
834 F.2d 389, 392 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that failure of prison officials to provide proper toilet
facilities for paraplegic inmate violaled eighth amendment). Though not an excessive force case,
Lafaut recognizes that some exigency of circumstances is necessary before applying Whitley's malice
standard.
36. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
37. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
38. Id. at 19 n.16.
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seizure. 39 The application of force implicates a person's fourth amendment right whenever that person maintains a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his bodily integrity that protects him from such intrusion.4° A
claim that an officer applied excessive force during an arrest or stop
therefore raises a potential violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures.
The Supreme Court reinforced the breadth of the notion of
"seizure" in addressing the excessive force claim presented in Tennessee
v. Garner.41 Garner involved an unarmed fifteen-year old burglary suspect who was shot and killed by the police as he attempted to flee. The
suspect's parents filed a section 1983 claim against the police officers, the
police department and the city of Memphis. In evaluating the claim, the
Court stated that "there can be no question that apprehension by the use
of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment." 4 2 The Court then balanced "'the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' "43 (being accosted by the use of deadly force) against the harm that
would have occurred without the use of force (the escape of an unarmed
nondangerous suspect).44 The Court concluded that the use of deadly
force to apprehend a nondangerous suspect violates the fourth
45
amendment.
The claim in Garner was that the police applied excessive force
against Garner in violation of his constitutional rights. Yet nowhere in
the opinion did the Court mention substantive due process or the Johnson factors. 4 6 This omission is easily understandable in light of the
fourth amendment's reasonableness standard. The fourth amendment
simply is not concerned with the severity of a plaintiff's injuries.47 Nor is
the fourth amendment concerned, as a threshold matter, with whether an
officer acted "in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
39. Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 388 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
40. See, eg., Winston, 470 U.S. at 767 (1985).
41. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).

42. Id. at 7.
43. Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
44. Id. at 8-11.
45. Id. at 11.
46. The Sixth Circuit had held the statute invalid under the due process clause as well as the
fourth amendment. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 246-47 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd,
471 U.S. I (1985).
47. Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987). The severity of the plaintiff's
injury is of course relevant to the issue of damages, but only after a fourth amendment violation is
established.
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maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm."'4 8 As the
Supreme Court held in Scott v. United States,49 the existence of a fourth

amendment violation depends wholly upon "an objective assessment of
[an] officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
him at the time."'50 An officer's subjective good faith affords him no
comfort if that objective assessment reveals that his conduct was unrea-

sonable. Similarly, the officer's overt malice or sadism does not make his
actions unconstitutional if those actions were justified by the facts present
at the time he acted. No Supreme Court decision has suggested that
"malice" is relevant to the determination of whether an officer violated
51
the fourth amendment.

Applying the Johnson standard to every excessive force claim implicating fourth amendment rights can produce inexplicable results, as is
demonstrated by applying that standard to the claim presented in Gar-

ner. The officers in Garner did not act maliciously and sadistically for
the very purpose of causing Garner harm. Instead, they acted in good
faith reliance on a Tennessee statute that authorized the use of deadly

force against fleeing felons.52 Under the Johnson standard, a decisionmaker would consider the officers' good faith and could conclude
48. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). While
an officer's objective good faith is relevant to the applicability of the exclusionary rule, United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-23 (1984), it is not relevant to the question whether a fourth amendment
violation has occurred.
49. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
50. Id. at 136.
51. One recent decision suggested that Johnson's characterization of force that is applied "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" may merely describe conduct that is
objectively unreasonable, rather than establish malice as a prerequisite to the existence of a constitutional violation. Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 383 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc). Certainly it is often
true that force that is applied in bad faith is objectively unreasonable as well, but this is not necessarilytrue. Force that is applied for illegitimate reasons may yet be entirely reasonable under the
circumstances. See infra note 104. Likewise, force that is applied with good faith may still be objectively unreasonable. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. In short, a court can determine
whether an officer complied with the fourth amendment without any examination of the officer's
subjective motivation.
As a result, requiring a decisionmaker to consider an officer's good or bad faith pollutes the
proper analysis of excessive force claims. When jurors receive the boilerplate excessive force instruction, they are told that they must consider whether force was applied "in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."
The average juror hears this and concludes: "If the officer acted in good faith, it must have been
constitutional. If the officer acted in bad faith and meant to hurt the plaintiff, it must have been
unconstitutional." Such a conclusion is simply wrong under any rational reading of the Court's
fourth amendment decisions.
52. The statute provided that "[i]f, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either
flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest." TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982) (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1987 Supp.)). The Court
held that the statute was unconstitutional inasmuch as it authorized the use of force against suspects
such as Garner. Garner,471 U.S. at 11, 20-21.
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that the officers did not violate Garner's constitutional rights. Yet the
Supreme Court, faced with these very facts, decided that the officers without doubt violated Garner's constitutional rights. Consideration of the
Johnson factors therefore allows the decisionmaker to short-circuit the
fourth amendment's objective inquiry and bestows upon officials a potential subjective good faith immunity that the Supreme Court repeatedly
53
has held they do not possess.
IV
Whitley and Garner provide the federal courts with clear guidance
regarding the standards for evaluating the excessive force claims of prisoners and persons subjected to an arrest or investigatory stop. The
Supreme Court, however, has not yet faced the question of what standards are appropriate for evaluating the excessive force claims of pretrial
detainees. Most authorities have maintained that the due process clause
is the proper vehicle for analyzing a pretrial detainee's excessive force
claim. 54 A detainee's interest in bodily privacy and integrity is coterminous with an ordinary citizen's, however, so one rightly can wonder why
the fourth amendment should not also protect detainees from excessive
force.
Since a reasonable officer at the time of the shooting would not have known of the statute's
infirmity, however, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages. See
Garner, 600, F.2d at 54. This immunity arises not because the officers acted with subjective good
faith, but because at the time of the shooting it was not clearly established that such a shooting
would violate Gamer's rights. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-35 (1985); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982).
53. See supra note 52.
54. See, eg., Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Johnson, 481 F.2d at
1033; see also cases cited supra note 20. But see Justice, 834 F.2d at 383 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
One commentator has characterized Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), as holding that the
due process clause is the proper textual source of protection from excessive force for detainees.
Comment, Excessive Force Claims: Removing the DoubleStandard, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1369, 137576, 1387-88 (1986). This characterization is incorrect. Wolfish was a class action challenging various conditions of pretrial detention. None of those conditions involved the use of serious physical
force. The conditions of detention (double-bunking of inmates, for example) that implicated "only
the protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law," Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535
(emphasis added), were analyzed solely under the due process clause. In contrast, other conditions
of detention (shakedown searches, strip searches, and visual body cavity searches) implicated detainees' fourth amendment privacy interests as well. The Court analyzed these conditions under the
fourth amendment before addressing any due process challenge. Id. at 555-60. Correctly viewed,
Wolfish stands for the proposition that the constitutionality of official conduct is determined in the
first instance by reference to the primary constitutional right implicated by that conduct. As stated
infra notes 55-78 and accompanying text, Supreme Court precedent seems to suggest that the use of
serious physical force against a detainee primarily implicates his fourth amendment interests in freedom from bodily intrusions.
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Excessive force decisions have identified two types of pretrial detainees-one whose arrest has been completed but who is not confined in a
prison cell and one who is held in a cell pending trial. The circuits have
held that excessive force against the first type of detainee--one who is
not detained in a cell-only implicates his rights under the due process
clause. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that the fourth
amendment does not cease to apply simply because an arrest is complete.
In both Schmerber v. California55 and Winston v. Lee 56 the suspect's
arrest already had been effected prior to the challenged physical intrusions,57 yet in each case the Court applied the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard to judge the constitutionality of the state's
conduct. 58 These decisions demonstrate that the fourth amendment is
not concerned with whether an excessive force plaintiff was an "arrestee"
or a "detainee." 59 Rather, as Winston recognized, the fourth amendment
is concerned with whether a citizen has been subjected to "unreasonable
governmental intrusions into any area in which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy." '60 If the citizen has been subjected to such intrusions, those intrnsions are unconstitutional regardless of the citizen's
status.
The Supreme Court's broad definition of "seizure" in Terry and
Garner surely encompasses the purposeful use of force against this type
detainee. As Judge Phillips recognized in dissenting from the en banc
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
61
Justice v. Dennis:
55. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (police-ordered extraction of blood from drunk-driving suspect).
56. 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (court-ordered surgery to remove bullet for evidentiary purposes).
57. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758 (blood drawn after arrest at hospital); Winston, 470 U.S. at 75557 (suspect had been charged; surgery scheduled three months later).
58. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766-72; Winston, 470 U.S. at 758-66.
59. As a policy matter, it is unclear why a person's status as an "arrestee" or "detainee not in a
jail cell" should make any difference in the constitutional inquiry. One commentator who correctly
recognized that Garner governs arrest-related excessive force claims made the following
observations:
[C]riticisms leveled at due process scrutiny seem no less compelling in the detainment context than in the arrest context. In fact, one must ask further why suspects during arrests
are protected (by the fourth amendment) against "unreasonable" conduct, while detainees
receive protection only against "malicious" or "shocking" conduct under the due process
test. In some ways, it would seem, the arrest standard should be more deferential than the
detainment standard. The exigencies of arrest and the need to defer to an officer's judgment in a quickly developing situation are indisputably diminished in the detainment context; there is no apparent reason for affording the officer greater discretion in that context.
Comment, supra note 54, at 1389. Moreover, distinguishing between an "arrestee" and a "detainee"
requires courts to make the often metaphysical determination of precisely when an arrest is complete. For an example of the difficulty and abstraction involved in this determintion, see Justice v.
Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 383 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
60. Winston, 470 U.S. at 767 (emphasis added).
61. 834 F.2d at 383 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
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Terry v. Ohio has long since settled that a "seizure" of the person
within the fourth amendment's meaning is not limited to conduct that
constitutes a "technical arrest," and instead encompasses any conduct
that "by means of physical force ...

has in some way restrained the

liberty of a citizen." It would be a strange doctrinal twist indeed that
treated as "seizures" the limited intrusions, without any use of physical force, that are routinely now considered "Terry stops," but did not
treat as a "seizure" the direct use of physical force in subduing a person in custody just because his "arrest" had already been effected. I
am satisfied that it is a twist not present in controlling fourth amendment doctrine. Rather, it seems obvious to me that within Terry's
analysis any application of physical force to a citizen which has the
effect of disabling, him physically to any extent is a "restraint
on his
62
liberty," leaving only the question of its reasonableness.
The second type of pretrial detainee is a person who is held in a cell
pending trial. The Supreme Court has noted that this type of detainee
does not possess "the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual."' 63 Gratuitous language in the Court's prison search decisions, however, has created the impression that pretrial detainees in prison cells
retain no fourth amendment rights at all.
In Bell v. Wolfish, 64 the Court rejected a fourth amendment challenge by pretrial detainees to jail rules authorizing random cell searches
and visual body cavity searches. 65 The Court merely assumed without
deciding that a pretrial detainee in a prison cell retained a "diminished
expectation of privacy" from such practices. 66 The Court revisited the
issue of privacy in prison cells, however, in Hudson v. Palmer.67 In Hudson, a convicted prisoner had filed a section 1983 action claiming that a
search of his cell and seizure of his property discovered during the search
violated the fourth amendment. The Court rejected the inmate's claim,
stating that "society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison
cell." 68 The Court thus held that "the Fourth Amendment proscription
against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the
prison cell."'69 The Court also rejected, for similar reasons, the inmate's
claim that the seizure of his property was unreasonable. 70 From these
62. Id. at 387-88 (citations omitted).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
Id. at 555-60.
Id. at 557.
468 U.S. 517 (1984).

68. Id. at 526.
69. Id.

70. The Court stated:
[Tihe same reasons that lead us to conclude that the Fourth Amendment's proscription
against unreasonable searches is inapplicable in a prison cell, apply with controlling force
I
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premises, the Court concluded that "the Fourth Amendment has no ap'7 1
plicability to a prison cell."

Hudson's broad statements could lead one to conclude mistakenly
that the fourth amendment does not protect jailed detainees from exces-

sive force. It is true that shakedown searches of a cell and the seizure of
property in that cell do not violate the fourth amendment. That is true,
however, not because the fourth amendment never applies in a cell, but
because a detainee's expectation of privacy in his cell and possessions is
always outweighed by the state's interest in institutional security. 72 The

detainee's expectation of privacy is therefore not "legitimate" and is unworthy of fourth amendment protection. 73 This is quite different from
the proposition that the fourth amendment never applies within the confines of a cell, however, for to say that a detainee has no legitimate expec-

tation of privacy from a shakedown search differs from saying that he has
no legitimate expectation of privacy from an arbitrary beating.
The Court in Wolfish and Hudson simply did not have to decide

whether a person in a cell retains any legitimate expectation of privacy in
his bodily integrity that protects him from severe physical intrusions
such as excessive force. The question is of no importance in the case of
prisoners, because they are protected by the eighth amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 74 Detainees, however, do not enjoy the protections of the eighth amendment. 75 To hold that the fourth
to seizures. Prison officials must be free to seize from cells any articles which, in their view,
disserve legitimate institutional interests.
Id. at 528 n.8.
71. Id. at 536.
72. See id. at 526-28.
73. Id. at 530.
74. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment, which is specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as the
primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in cases... where the deliberate use
of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified.").
One rightly can wonder why a prisoner should not also retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bodily integrity and therefore enjoy fourth amendment protection from excessive physical
force in cases in which prison officials have no legitimate punitive or disciplinary purpose for using
force. Cf Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir.) ("[A]lthough a spontaneous attack by a
guard is 'cruel' and, we hope, 'unusual,' it does not fit any ordinary concept of punishment."), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). It seems logical to treat these instances of force as seizures rather than
punishment. This would make little practical difference, however, because heightened deference to
prison officials is unnecessary under Whitley when the force has no legitimate punitive or disciplinary purpose. In such a case, an eighth amendment standard like the Estelle "deliberate indifference" standard is required, and in practice such a standard would be almost indistinguishable from
the fourth amendment's reasonableness inquiry. In any event, the Court is quite unlikely to reconsider the issue of excessive force against prisoners when the ink on Whitley is scarcely dry.
75. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) ("Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated
with criminal prosecutions.").
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amendment never protects a detainee in a prison cell, one must conclude
that society is not prepared to recognize that a detainee retains any legitimate expectation of privacy from unwarranted force. Under such a rule,
the arbitrary or excessive use of force against a detainee would always be
a warranted, reasonable intrusion free from any fourth amendment
scrutiny.
Though the Supreme Court has not addressed the question, one
would suspect that the Court would hesitate to conclude that a jailed
detainee retains absolutely no legitimate expectation of privacy in his
bodily integrity. In Winston v. Lee, 76 the Court applied the fourth
amendment to strike down an order compelling a suspect to undergo
surgery to remove a bullet for its possible evidentiary use. If jailed detainees have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their bodily integrity,
state officials could take a suspect such as the one in Winston, detain him
in a cell and remove the bullet from his body without benefit of anesthesia, yet not even implicate his fourth amendment fights. Winston made
clear that a person outside of a cell maintains a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his bodily integrity that protects him from such an intrusion.
It is hard to imagine why that expectation of privacy should become illegitimate simply because the person is placed in a cell. While concerns of
institutional security will sometimes outweigh a detainee's expectation of
freedom from physical force, they will not do so in every case. 77 Courts
therefore should not conclude that jailed detainees retain no legitimate
expectation of freedom from severe physical intrusions. Instead, courts
should analyze a detainee's excessive force claim under the fourth
amendment's reasonableness standard, allowing due deference to state
78
officials when exigencies of institutional security are present.
V
Recently, in Lester v. City of Chicago,79 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the first federal court to reject
the substantive due process inquiry derived from Johnson. The plaintiff
76. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
77. Suppose, for example, that the prisoner in McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780 (9th Cir.
1986), see supra note 34, had been a detainee. Concerns of institutional security would not have
outweighed McRorie's expectation of privacy from having a riot stick rammed into his anus merely
because he involuntarily giggled during a stripsearch.
78. Where exigencies of institutional security are present, the fourth amendment standard

would allow state officials greater latitude in using force in response to those exigencies. Under the
Garner balancing test, as the "importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion" increases, the more serious "the nature and quality of the intrusion" can be without being
unreasonable and violating the fourth amendment. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
79. 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
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in Lester had filed a section 1983 action claiming that officers used excessive force while arresting her. The district court instructed the jury in
accordance with the Seventh Circuit decision in Gumz v. Morrissette.8 0
Gumz had held that an officer's use of force is unconstitutional if it
causes severe injuries, is grossly disproportionate to the need for the force
and is inspired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of
zeal.8 The jury, considering each of these factors, returned a verdict in
favor of the officers.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that "the proper standard
for analyzing excessive force in arrest claims is a Fourth Amendment
standard, and not a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
standard. ' 82 This is so, said the court, because "the Fourth Amendment,
unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, is specifically directed to unreasonable seizures."' 83 The court rejected the suggestion that the Gumz/Johnson factors merely restated fourth amendment analysis, noting both that
the malice criterion is inconsistent with the objective reasonableness standard and that a seizure ean be unreasonable without causing serious injury. 84 Having recognized the incompatibility of substantive due process
and fourth amendment analysis, the court concluded that "there should
be no occasion to apply substantive due process standards... to an excessive force in arrest claim." 8 5
The Lester court limited its holding to arrest-related excessive force
claims, specifically reserving the question whether substantive due process retained vitality in other contexts. 86 The rationale of Lester, however, casts doubt upon the theoretical justification for continued
substantive due process analysis of any excessive force claim. This doubt
is well-founded when one examines why the Johnson court initially
adopted the substantive due process standard. This examination-enlightened by intervening Supreme Court developments-leads to the conclusion that the unreflective adherence to substantive due process has
flawed the analysis of excessive force claims.
Two plausible rationales could have supported the Johnson court's
adoption of a substantive due process standard. One explanation is the
court's apparent belief that the due process clause provided protection
from police brutality that was broader in scope than that provided by
80. 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985), overruled, Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th
Cir. 1987).
81. 772 F.2d at 1400.
82. Lester, 830 F.2d at 710.
83. Id. at 712.

84. Id. at 712-13.
85. Id. at 713.
86. Id. at 713 & n.7.
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other amendments.8 7 Under this rationale, Johnson stands for the proposition that the due process clause provides one's primary source of constitutional protection from excessive force. The other explanation is that
the Johnson court, relying on the weight of prior authority, believed that
the plaintiff's status as a pretrial detainee made it impossible to analyze
his clain under the fourth or eighth amendment."" Faced with a plaintiff
who clearly had been wronged, the Johnson court used what it thought
was the only available tree from which to hang the responsible officialRochin's substantive due process standard.
Intervening developments, however, have undercut these rationales.
When the Supreme Court decided Rochin, the fourth amendment did not
yet apply to the states. Without the due process clause, the Court would
have been powerless to control intrusive police practices such as stomach-pumping. Since the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment
applies to the states,8 9 however, the Court has never again used Rochin
to analyze the constitutionality of physically intrusive official conduct.
Instead, the Court has looked solely to the fourth amendment--or, in the
case of prisoners, to the eighth-to determine the constitutionality of serious physical intrusions. 90
Moreover, the Court has rejected the recurring suggestion that the
due process clause provides one's primary source of protection from intrusive searches and seizures. As previously mentioned, the Court applied the fourth amendment in Winston v. Lee 91 to forbid a state from
compelling a suspect to undergo surgery to remove a bullet for use as
evidence of the suspect's guilt. In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,92 the Court applied the fourth amendment to uphold the extended detention of a suspected "alimentary canal" smuggler in order to
87. The Johnson court stated:

[C]onstitutional protection against police brutality is not limited to conduct violating the
specific command of the Eighth Amendment or... of the Fourth. Rochin v. California
must stand for the proposition that, quite apart from any "specific" of the Bill of Rights,
application of undue force by law enforcement officers deprives a suspect of liberty without
due process of law.
481 F.2d at 1032 (citations omitted). It is unclear whether the Johnson court felt bound by Rochin
to rcach this conclusion or whether the court instead extrapolated this conclusion from Rochin's
general discussion. In either event, Johnson clearly recognized the due process clause as the primary
source of constitutional protection from excessive force.
88. The Johnson court stated that "most of the courts faced with challenges to the conditions of
pre-trial detention have primarily based their analysis directly on the due process clause." Id. at
1033.
89. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538-41 (1985); Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1985); Winston v. Lee, 470 US. 753, 758-66 (1985); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966).
91. 470 U.S. 753, 763-66 (1985).
92. 473 U.S. 531, 541-44 (1985).
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examine her feces for drugs. In Winston and Montoya, as well as in Garner, the Court ignored the due process clause, forsaking Rochin in favor
93
of fourth amendment analysis.
The Court's disfavor with substantive due process analysis of physical intrusions has not been merely implicit. In Whitley, the Court explicitly rejected the suggestion that the due process clause provided a
convict's primary source of protection from excessive force. Because the
eighth amendment "is specifically concerned with the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions," the Court concluded that
the eighth amendment "serves as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in cases .. where the deliberate use of
force is challenged as excessive and unjustified."' 94 Wlitley recognizes
that the due process clause-assuming that indeed it has substantive content95-provides protection that is at best duplicative of that provided by
96
the eighth amendment.
In light of these developments, there exists no need for substantive
due process analysis of excessive force claims. On the one hand, the
Court's excessive force decisions suggest that if the use of force violates
the fourth or eighth amendment, any protection provided by the due process clause is merely duplicative. On the other hand, if the use of force
does not transgress the fourth or eighth amendment, then the Supreme
Court's decision in Baker P.McCollan97 suggests that no due process
violation occurs. In Baker, the Court faced a plaintiff's section 1983
claim that his detention over a weekend pursuant to a facially valid warrant deprived him of liberty without due process of law. The Court rejected this claim, holding that the government's compliance with the
fourth amendment accorded the plaintiff due process. 98 Baker thus suggests that when officials apply physical force without transgressing the
standards of the fourth or eighth amendment, they have not deprived the
object of that force of liberty without due process of law.
93. Winston mentioned Rochin only in a footnote. 470 U.S. at 762 n.5. Neither Montoya nor
Garner mentioned Rochin.
94. 475 U.S. at 327 (emphasis added).
95. Several federal judges have argued vehemently that the due process clause does not possess
substantive content in this context. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1510-11 (11th
Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J.,
dissenting in part, joined by Roney and Fay, JJ.),
cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1115 and 476 U.S. 1124 (1986); Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1404-09 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring in the judgment), overruled, Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706,

713 (7th Cir. 1987).
96. 475 U.S. at 327.

97. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
98. Id. at 142-46.
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VI
Despite these developments, the circuits have continued almost
without exception to apply all of the Johnson substantive due process
factors to every excessive force claim, regardless of whether that claim
actually implicates a fourth or eighth amendment right. This blind adherence to substantive due process has resulted in the creation of an abstract constitutional right to be free of excessive force. This "right"defined and protected solely by the Johnson standard-has become distinct from any specific constitutional guarantee.
This point is best demonstrated by the majority opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit en banc in Justice
v. Dennis.99 Justice involved a drunk driving suspect who filed a section
1983 action claiming that the arresting officers applied excessive force
against him in the stationhouse following his arrest. The district court
instructed the jury to consider all of the Johnson factors, and the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the officers. In rejecting the plaintiff's appeal, the Fourth Circuit majority stated:
Courts, including our own, have experienced some difficulty in
defining the scope of liability for excessive force as a constitutional tort
under section 1983. The dilemma has been complicated by the fact
that claims of excessive force may arise in the context of the fourth,
eighth, or as in this instance, the fifth amendment. Subtle efforts at
distinction are, therefore, common in cases in this area.
There are, nevertheless, certain basic principles in section 1983
jurisprudence as it relates to claims of excessive force that are beyond
question.1oo
The Justice majority concluded that the Johnson substantive due process
factors, as incorporated in the jury instructions, "'fairly and adequately
state[d] the pertinent legal principles involved'" in evaluating excessive
force claims.10 1
Justice thus requires the decisionmaker to consider in every instance
whether the force was applied maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm and whether the force caused serious injuries,
even though the use of force implicates rights to which the fourth or
eighth amendment is specifically addressed. This is nothing more than
the creation and application of an abstract constitutional right to be free
of excessive force. For the hypothetical plaintiff set forth at the beginning of this comment1 02 to recover on his constitutional claim, he could
99. 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
100. Id. at 382 (citation omitted). Presumably when the Justice court said "fifth amendment," it
meant "fourteenth amendment."
101. Id. at 383 (quoting Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., 576 F.2d 1072, 1076 (4th Cir. 1978)).
102. See supra text following note 2.
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not merely demonstrate a violation of his fourth amendment fights as
defined by the objective standards of Garner, Winston and Terry. Instead, he would have to demonstrate a violation of his "fight" to be free
of excessive force as defined by the Johnson/Justice "basic principles of
' 10 3
section 1983 jurisprudence."
Try as one might to find it, there is no authority in Supreme Court
precedent for an abstract, uniform constitutional fight to be free of excessive force. As Garner and Whitley indicate respectively, citizens have a
specific right to be free of force that constitutes an unreasonable seizure
and prisoners have a specific right to be free of force that constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment. These different fights are protected by
independent constitutional standards. Moreover, neither of these standards requires all plaintiffs to demonstrate that officials caused serious
injury and acted maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm. The circuits' continued application of the Johnson factors
therefore constitutes a perverse sort of judicial activism. The circuits
have fashioned an abstract right to be free of excessive force, yet have
fashioned a standard to protect that right that is inconsistent with, and
often more restrictive than, the standards protecting the specific constitutional right implicated by the use of force. 1°4
One can scarcely impugn the desire of the federal courts-who are
faced with a growing torrent of excessive force cases-to fashion rules
that discourage frivolous excessive force claims. As circuit courts have
recognized, not every push or shove by a state official violates the Consti-

103. Justice, 834 F.2d at 382. The Justice majority seems to have overlooked the Supreme
Court's admonition in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), that there are no basic principles of
section 1983 jurisprudence. Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights; it merely creates an
express right to sue to vindicate already defined federal or constitutional rights. Id. at 144 n.3.
Instead, principles of constitutional jurisprudence-fourth and eighth amendment jurisprudencegovern constitutional decisionmaking in excessive force cases and courts must apply these principles
when a plaintiff brings an excessive force claim under section 1983.
104. It bears noting, however, that while the Johnson malice standard may operate to defeat
meritorious excessive force claims, it can also operate less restrictively than a purely objective reasonableness standard. Assume, for example, that a police officer is pursuing a murder suspect. The
suspect turns and begins to fire upon the officer. A reasonable officer in this position likely could,
depending upon the surrounding circumstances, use deadly force to subdue the suspect without
violating the fourth amendment. Suppose an officer being fired upon, however, decides to use deadly
force not because the suspect is firing upon him but rather because the suspect is black and the officer
hates blacks. The officer's action-using deadly force-remains objectively reasonable and Garner
suggests that this should be the end of the excessive force inquiry. Yet under the Johnson standard,
a jury could return a verdict against the officer on these facts, since he clearly acted with malice for
the very purpose of causing harm. The Johnson standard thus creates the unfortunate possibility of
plaintiffs being able to raise issues, such as an officer's racist or sadistic motivations or prior bad acts,
that are irrelevant to a proper fourth amendment inquiry.
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tution. 10 5 This statement, however, is not a premise for heightening the
constitutional burden on excessive force plaintiffs, but rather is the natural conclusion of the proper constitutional inquiry. The price of having
constitutional protection from physical intrusion is that every push or
shove by a state officer is a potential constitutional violation, depending
upon whether it transgresses the proper constitutional standards. The
Supreme Court has not seen fit to immunize law enforcement officials
from the adverse consequences of this constitutional determination based
on those officials' pure hearts. Certainly, federal courts should not be
flooded with meritless excessive force cases. Equally certainly, federal
courts are capable of fashioning rules that discourage meritless cases
without undermining the integrity and consistency of constitutional
standards.
VII
Johnson v. Glick 106 first adopted substantive due process analysis of
excessive force claims based on the Supreme Court's Rochin v. California 107 decision and the perceived inapplicability of the fourth or eighth
amendment. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have forsaken
Rochin's substantive due process analysis of physically intrusive government conduct. Those decisions suggest that courts should judge the constitutionality of physical force by applying the standard developed to
protect the specific fourth or eighth amendment right implicated by the
use of force. The courts' continued adherence to the Johnson standard
despite these developments has flawed the analysis of excessive force
claims, particularly those implicating fourth amendment rights. Courts
should therefore abandon the Johnson approach in excessive force cases.
In cases involving prisoner claims, courts should faithfully comply with
the bifurcated inquiry of Whitley v. Albers. 108 In all other excessive force
cases, courts should apply the fourth amendment's objective reasonableness standard as elaborated in Tennessee v. Garner10 9 and the Supreme
Court's other fourth amendment decisions.

105. See, e.g., Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945, 949-50 (4th Cir. 1987); Johnson v.
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
106. 481 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
107. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
108. 475 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1986).
109. 471 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1985).

